Controlling the Watchdog: Politics-Laws of Parliamentary Intervention on the Constitutional Court in Indonesia and Italy
Abstract
Introduction: This article examines the problem of legislative encroachment as a subtle form of political intervention that threatens judicial independence in constitutional courts. The issue becomes crucial because constitutional courts function as guardians of the constitution and possess authority to invalidate parliamentary legislation. Indonesia and Italy provide relevant comparative cases due to their civil law tradition and parliamentary involvement in appointing constitutional judges.
Purposes of the Research: The purpose of this study is to analyze the forms and mechanisms of parliamentary intervention over constitutional court judges in Indonesia and Italy, both normatively and in practice. This research also aims to identify political-legal factors that encourage such interference. Furthermore, it seeks to formulate an ideal model of constitutional safeguards to limit parliamentary power while maintaining judicial accountability.
Methods of the Research: This study employs normative legal research with statutory and constitutional analysis. It uses comparative and conceptual approaches by comparing Indonesian and Italian constitutional court frameworks and examining concepts of judicial independence, legislative encroachment, and constitutional safeguards. Legal materials include primary constitutional norms, secondary scholarly works, and tertiary legal references.
Results Main Findings of the Research: The novelty of this study lies in the identification of two different patterns of legislative encroachment, 'active threats' (Indonesia) manifested through the politicization of selection and reactive legislative reforms, versus 'passive threats' (Italy) manifested through institutional deadlock and lottizzazione practices, which are influenced by political coalition configurations and procedural design of selection. The proposed safeguard model is not only normative, but also integrates the principles of bounded accountability and self-binding to address structural vulnerabilities. The conclusions of the main findings show that the legislative pattern of encroachment in Indonesia tends to be active (politicization of selection, reactive legislative modification), while in Italy it is passive (institutional impasse, lottizzazione), both of which are influenced by domestic political dynamics and procedural design.
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